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Compelling Freedom on Campus: 
A Free Speech Paradox
Jamie Cameron*
Introduction
In 1985, it was largely unknown how the Supreme Court of Canada would respond to the 
Charter.1 At first glance, a drugstore’s right to be open for business on Sunday, selling grocer-
ies, plastic cups, and a bicycle lock, seemed an unlikely source of inspiration for the Court’s 
first pronouncement on the essence of freedom. Perhaps unexpectedly, the justices enforced 
the entitlement, finding that a Sunday closing law compelling a corporation to comply with 
the Christian Sabbath infringed section 2(a)’s guarantee of religious freedom.2 In doing so, R 
v Big M Drug Mart defined freedom as “the absence of coercion or constraint,” stating without 
equivocation that no one who is compelled “to a course of action or inaction” is “truly free”.3 
In Justice Dickson’s considered view, coercion includes “blatant forms of compulsion”, such as 
“direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanctions”, as well as forms of indi-
rect control.4 In plain and unmistakeable terms, Big M promised that, under the Charter, “no 
one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or conscience”.5
 * Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School. I thank Kate Bezanson and Alison Braley-Rattai for including 
me in this special issue of Constitutional Forum, and am grateful to Kate Bezanson for her comments on 
an earlier draft. I also thank Ryan Ng (JD 2021) for his valuable research assistance in the preparation of 
this paper. Finally, I note that I was a member of York University’s Free Speech Working Group in fall 2018. 
This paper does not in any way express the views of York University or the Working Group, which has long 
since disbanded.
 1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2(a), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
 2 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M].
 3 Ibid at 336.
 4 Ibid.
 5 Ibid at 337 
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At a time of worrying forms of state-prescribed ideologies, creeds, and partisan positions, 
Big M’s idea of freedom remains monumental, and vital. The precarity of shared values and 
wedging of public discourse have loosened the bonds of democratic community, with expres-
sive freedom emerging as one of the prime battlegrounds. Those in power realize that domi-
nant values can be coercively defended by silencing those who offend majoritarian impulses, 
and can also be promoted by forcing minorities and non-conformists to adopt state-based 
values. In Quebec, Bill 21 compels those whose faith requires face covering and other forms of 
apparel-based religious observance to comply with an official policy of state secularity. Those 
who cannot or will not comply are disqualified from providing or receiving a variety of gov-
ernment services.6 While resistance to Bill 21 is highly mobilized, there has been less focus 
on the crux of the law which, in coercing the adoption of secular values that offend against 
religious observance, is in principle a compulsion of identity. Quebec’s “laicity of the state” is a 
profound affront to Big M’s principal insight that compelling a prescribed view of religion — 
or non-religion — is deeply destructive of freedom.7
Elsewhere, the government of Ontario compels gas pumps in the province to carry 
stickers publicizing its battle with the federal government on carbon taxes, potentially 
attaching significant fines to non-compliance.8 Backwardly, the government proclaimed 
that its mandatory stickers advance free expression and transparency, in doing so over-
looking the state’s appropriation of citizen voices to create a forum for its partisan views.9 
On another front, medical professionals, institutions, and organizations are compelled to 
provide services and forms of treatment that offend religious and conscientious beliefs and 
sensibilities.10
Compelled expression and association also surface in forms referred to, at times, as “virtue 
signalling”.11 One such example, the 2017 Canada Summer Jobs program, made eligibility for 
federally funded summer employment contingent on an applicant’s declaration of support for 
 6 Bill 21, An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State, 1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Quebec 2019 (assented to 16 June 
2019), SQ 2019, c 12.
 7 See also Mouvement laïque Québécois v City of Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16 at paras 74-75 (endorsing “a neutral 
public space free from coercion, pressure and judgment on the part of public authorities in matters of 
spirituality”, and stating that the state may not, “by expressing its own religious preference, promote the 
participation of believers to the exclusion of non-believers or vice-versa”; emphasis added). 
 8 Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act, SO 2019, c 7, Schedule 23 (requiring government-prescribed stickers 
to be displayed in certain ways on gas pumps, and outlining the consequences and penalties for non-
compliance). Though the Provincial Offences Act allows fines of $5000 for a first offence and $10,000 for 
subsequent offences, the government has indicated that inspectors will be instructed to give warnings. It 
is also reported that the chief justice has set fines at $150. Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 
“Ontario’s Gas Station Carbon Tax Stickers — What You Need to Know” (2019), online: <cfib-fcei.ca/en/
Ontario_Carbon_Tax_Stickers>. 
 9 Allison Jones, “Ford government argues carbon tax stickers on gas pumps help ‘further’ free expression”, 
CTV News (30 October 2019) online: <toronto.ctvnews.ca/ford-government-argues-carbon-tax-stickers-
on-gas-pumps-help-further-free-expression-1.4662986>. 
 10 See Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2019 
ONCA 393 (finding a violation of religious freedom and upholding the limit under s 1 of the Charter).
 11 Defined, in one source, as “behaviour that is aimed at demonstrating one’s own enlightened attitudes”. 
See Collins Dictionary, “virtue-signalling”, online: <collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/virtue-
signalling>.
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governmentally prescribed values.12 Another instance is the mandatory Statement of Prin-
ciples (SOP), which required members of the legal profession to make a declaration adopting 
or endorsing the Law Society of Ontario’s official objectives on equity in the profession.13 That 
initiative inspired a revolt that led to a radical shift in law society governance, and repeal of 
the SOP.14
Among a panoply of state-based coercive measures, the introduction of mandatory free 
speech policies for publicly funded colleges and universities is one of the most ominous. In 
two provinces, Ontario and Alberta, the government has directed colleges and universities to 
adopt and comply with an official free speech policy that is modelled on the US-based Chicago 
Statement on Principles of Free Expression.15 That model was inspired by, and responded to, 
a perception that some perspectives and voices had been shut down and shut out of campus 
discourse. Rather than respect the autonomy of colleges and universities to develop internal 
policies, provincial governments in Canada imposed a mandatory policy on free expression. 
In doing so, their actions appropriated and transformed the Chicago Statement from a policy 
for internal governance into a diktat of the state.
It is manifest and axiomatic that compulsion is not freedom, and that a mandatory policy 
is the opposite, not the epitome, of free expression. Though it may not be as egregious as Bill 
21’s coercion of individual identity, this compulsion of institutional and academic identity dif-
fers little in principle. While commenting in passing on the breach of institutional autonomy 
and academic freedom, this brief reflection lingers more on the question of compulsion. Spe-
cifically, the discussion calls for Big M’s conception of freedom as the absence of coercion to 
be refreshed, re-invigorated, and robustly promoted in this and other settings.
The Chicago Statement transformed: from freedom to coercion
The Chicago Statement presents a vision of free speech that, on its face, is more conventional 
than radical, explaining that a university’s commitment to “free and open inquiry” demands 
 12 See Brian Bird, “Canada Summer Jobs Program and the Charter Problem”, Policy Options (16 January 
2018) online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2018/canada-summer-jobs-and-the-charter-
problem/> (explaining the Charter implications of the 2018 program’s mandatory attestation that applicants 
respect human rights and Charter values, and specifically endorse reproductive rights, defined as “the right 
to access safe and legal abortions”; also accusing the Trudeau government of “weaponizing” the Charter); 
The following year applicants were required to attest that no funding from Canada Summer Jobs would be 
used to “undermine or restrict rights legally protected in Canada”. Cited in David Ross, “A New Canada 
Summer Job Attestation: The Good, the (Potentially) Bad, and the Unknown” (20 December 2018), online 
(blog): Christian Legal Fellowship <http://www.christianlegalfellowship.org/blog/2018/12/20/a-new-
canada-summer-jobs-attestation-for-2019-the-good-the-potentially-bad-and-the-unknown>.
 13 See Law Society of Ontario, “Guide to the Application of Recommendation 3(1)” (undated), online (pdf): 
<jurisource.ca/prj/phpe7rTLf1551195791.pdf>
 14 See generally, Jacques Gallant, “Law Society Scraps key diversity initiative”, The Star (11 September 2019) 
online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/09/11/law-society-scraps-key-diversity-initiative.html>. 
 15 See University of Chicago, “Statement on Principles of Free Expression” (July 2012), online: 
<liberalstudiesguides.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/Statement-on-Principles-of-Free-
Expression-_-Free-Expression-_-The-University-of-Chicago.pdf>; See also University of Chicago, “Report 
of the Committee on Freedom of Expression” (undated), online (pdf): <https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/FOECommitteeReport.pdf>.
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“the broadest possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge and learn”.16 This latitude 
extends to ideas that are “thought to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed”, and 
is bi-directional or reciprocal in nature, directing members of the community to “act in 
conformity with this principle”.17 Accordingly, the Statement denounces obstruction, dis-
ruption, or interference with the freedom of others, calling on the community instead to 
deploy “robust counter-speech” in the face of offensive or disagreeable thoughts.18 Recog-
nizing, as well, that any “vibrant commitment to free and open inquiry” must tolerate lim-
its, the Statement proposes restrictions on expression that violates the law, and allows for 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to enable the university to function without 
disruption.19
The Chicago Statement has been remarkably influential in the United States, where it has 
reportedly been adopted by more than sixty institutions.20 In an environment of perennially 
attentive and unrequited debate, the Statement is not without detractors who challenge its 
soundness and objectives. On one account, the Statement advances a “legalistic and formal 
framework” that applies “blunt tools” to diverse and complex dynamics that do not reduce 
to a “one-size-fits-all statement”.21 Put another way, rigidity in a policy on free expression is 
somewhat at odds with the Statement’s professed objective of open inquiry. Moreover, the 
sermonizing tone of broad-brush principles belies the role context and community dynamics 
must play in any discussion of university free speech.22 To others, the Statement serves as a 
proxy for resistance to policies aimed at inclusive objectives and development of a “safe space” 
for learning on campus.23 Whatever its purpose or direction, the American debate on difficult 
questions of internal governance is by, for, and of the university community.
The Statement experienced a critical mutation when it crossed the border and re-surfaced 
in Canada. First endorsed by a conservative politician running for party leadership at the 
federal level of government, the Statement was appropriated and adopted by two provincial 





 20 Victor Yang, “The Chicago Principles Arrive at Other Universities”, The Chicago Maroon, May 23, 2019 
(stating that more than 63 institutions have adopted or endorsed the Chicago Statement, or a version of it). 
Online: <https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2019/5/24/chicago-principles-arrive-universities/>.
 21 Sigal Ben-Porath, “Against Endorsing the Chicago Principles”, Inside Higher Education (11 December 2018) 
online: <academicmatters.ca/against-endorsing-the-chicago-principles/>. 
 22 Ibid (stating that an institution’s endorsement of the principles could end the conversation and undermine 
its ability to fulfill its teaching mission).
 23 See e.g., Richard Pérez-Peña, Mitch Smith & Stephanie Saul, “University of Chicago Strikes Back Against 
Campus Political Correctness”, New York Times (16 August 2016) online: <nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/
university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness.html>. See also P.E. Moskowitz, 
The Case Against Free Speech (U.S.A.: Hachette Book Group, Inc., 2019) (providing extensive discussion of 
conservative movements and their interest in free speech issues on American campuses).
 24 This initiative had its Canadian genesis in the 2015 leadership campaign of federal Conservative Party 
leader, Andrew Scheer. The Statement’s evolution into an instrument of government control followed a 
pathway into Canada from Donald Trump, who first raised it as a way for American government to play a 
role on matters of internal university governance. A few years later, during the federal election campaign 
of fall 2019, then Conservative Party leader Andrew Scheer renewed his pledge to cut funding to any 
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel — The Campus Speech Issue 9
9
Chicago Statement was converted to a mechanism of regulation, emerging as a political direc-
tive that imposed a free expression policy on colleges and universities. Thus transformed, 
the Statement is not a matter of abstract or scholarly debate and university governance but is 
understood, more cynically, as a top-down ploy to protect and promote conservative voices 
on campus.
To back up a moment: the paradox of advanced education in Canada is that, in principle, 
colleges and universities are autonomous in their mission and pursuit of knowledge, but at the 
same time are dependent on public funding and subject to regulation by the state. This para-
dox has been functional over the years because governments accept the independence of insti-
tutions that serve the public interest by educating the community and advancing knowledge. 
The governmental regulation of free speech on campus sets the system — and its established 
understandings — on a new footing.
On August 30, 2018, the government of Ontario issued a directive requiring all publicly-
assisted colleges and universities in the province to post a free speech policy by January 1, 
2019. The directive was clear that institutional policies must meet “a minimum standard speci-
fied by the government”, and warned of reductions to operating grant funding for any institu-
tion not in compliance.25 Almost one year later, Alberta’s provincial government followed suit 
on July 4, 2019, calling on its colleges and universities to adopt the Chicago Statement or an 
equivalent, and setting December 15, 2019 as the deadline for compliance.26
This mutation diverted the Statement from its foundation in matters of university gover-
nance and re-styled it an instrument of government coercion. Compelling colleges and univer-
sities to adopt and comply with a government policy of free expression is offensive to institu-
tional autonomy, the core mission of a university, and the academic freedom of its community. 
Moreover, Ontario’s free speech directive is explicitly aimed at reining in the expressive activi-
ties of students; this essential aspect of the policy defies the text and purpose of the Chicago 
Statement.27 Hostility to student activism is evident in the directive’s demand for enforcement 
of government policy against students and their organizations, including  disciplinary  processes 
university or institute of higher learning that does not comply with the party’s conception of free speech. 
See Melanie Woods, “Conservative Platform Makes Free Speech Policies a Requirement for University 
Grants”, Huffington Post (11 October 2019) online: <huffingtonpost.ca/entry/andrew-scheer-free-speech-
conservative-platform_ca_5da10705e4b087efdbae5cb8>. See Conservative Party of Canada, “Andrew 
Scheer’s Plan for You to Get Ahead” (2019) at 61, online (pdf): <cpc-platform.s3.ca-central-1.amazonaws.
com/CPC_Platform_8.5x11_FINAL_EN_OCT11_web.pdf>.
 25 Office of the Premier, “Upholding Free Speech on Ontario’s University and College Campuses”, (31 August 
2018) online: <https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2018/08/upholding-free-speech-on-ontarios-university-
and-college-campuses.html> [emphasis added].
 26 In July 2019, the Advanced Education Minister “requested” that Alberta colleges and universities “strengthen” 
free expression on campus by adopting the Chicago Statement or an analogous policy compliant with the 
spirit of the Chicago Statement. In a letter dated July 4, 2019, the Minister advised institutions that “[i]t 
is your responsibility to ensure that whatever action is taken … demonstrates clear commitment to the key 
principles of free speech as found within the Chicago Statement” [emphasis added]. A copy of this letter is 
on file with the author.
 27 Office of the Premier, supra note 25 (requiring institutions to consider student group compliance with the 
free speech policy as a condition for ongoing financial support or recognition, and to encourage student 
unions to adopt policies that align with the free speech policy).
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in cases of “disruption” on campus.28 A subsequent directive decreeing that student fees, an 
established issue of local governance, must be optional confirmed the government’s antipathy 
to student activism. Without a hint of subtlety, the premier of Ontario stated, in defence of the 
policy, that “I think we all know what kind of crazy Marxist nonsense student unions get up 
to”.29 In fall 2019, the directive on student fees was quashed in court on the basis that the gov-
ernment has no legal authority to interfere in this aspect of university governance.30
Meanwhile, Alberta’s policy sets and aspires to a different and less confrontational 
approach. There, the process was promoted from the start as being “collaborative and col-
legial” in nature.31 Accordingly, the Minister of Advanced Education stated that he would be 
working closely with Alberta institutions “to ensure practice is compliant with the policies 
outlined”.32 The nuance there is that “[t]his unified approach provides a common understand-
ing of freedom of expression throughout Alberta’s post-secondary system, while giving insti-
tutions flexibility to create policies that meet their unique needs.”33 While Ontario’s threat 
of budget repercussions for non-compliance is explicitly coercive, Alberta’s does not address 
the implications of any failure to adopt or comply with the government’s policy. Moreover, 
Ontario targeted student activism and Alberta has not expressly done so. Though Ontario’s 
free speech directive is a more egregious interference, both government policies interfere with 
institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and the constitutionally protected rights of college 
and university communities.
Despite the appeal to collaboration, a negative reaction was more palpable in Alberta, 
where ex-premier Rachel Notley stated that “[t]his is not about free speech on campus” but is a 
matter of “the [United Conservative Party] dictating that colleges and universities owe every-
one, including hate groups, a platform”.34 Elsewhere, the Chicago Statement was described as 
an “ingenious manifesto that uses ‘free speech’ as code for the right of the privileged and pow-
erful to shout down everyone else”.35 As such, it was denounced for opening university cam-
 28 Ibid (declaring that existing student discipline measures must apply to students whose actions are contrary 
to the policy, including “ongoing disruptive protesting” that “significantly interferes” with an event).
 29 Quoted in Joe Friesen, “Doug Ford defends cutting mandatory student-union fees”, Globe & Mail (11 
February 2019) online: <theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-doug-ford-fundraising-letter-accuses-
student-unions-of-crazy-marxist/>.
 30 Canadian Federation of Students v Ontario, 2019 ONSC 6658 [Canadian Federation of Students]. The 
decision is under appeal.
 31 Moira Wyton, “Advanced Education minister promises Chicago Principles details coming soon as students, 
academics concerned for September deadline”, Edmonton Journal (19 June 2019) online: <edmontonjournal.
com/news/politics/advanced-education-minister-promises-chicago-principles-details-coming-soon-as-
students-academics-concerned-for-september-deadline>. 
 32 Stephanie Babych, “Universities hand in updated free-speech policies for review by provincial government”, 
Calgary Herald (updated 20 November 2019) online: <calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/universities-
hand-in-updated-free-speech-policies-for-review-by-provincial-government>.
 33 Government of Alberta, “Enhancing free speech on campuses”, Education News Canada (17 December 
2019) online: <educationnewscanada.com/article/organization/14113/807304/Enhancing-free-speech-
on-campuses.htm> (emphasis added). 
 34 Rachel Notley, “This is not about free speech on campus — we already have free speech. This is the UCP 
dictating that universities and colleges owe everyone, including hate groups, a platform.” (30 July 2019 at 
12:30), online: Twitter, <twitter.com/rachelnotley/status/1156270897952542721?lang=en>.
 35 David Climenhaga, “The ‘Chicago Principles’ are code for the right of the powerful and privileged to shout 
down everyone else” AlbertaPolitics.ca (30 July 2019) online: <albertapolitics.ca/2019/07/the-chicago-
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puses “wide to anti-union rights extremists and advocates of Trump-style racism”, and allow-
ing “anti-abortion radicals to harass and threaten users and workers on the steps of women’s 
health clinics”.36
In the meantime, and albeit with some grumbling, Ontario’s institutions of higher learning 
acquiesced in the government’s assertion of control over free speech on campus, posting poli-
cies in compliance with the Chicago Statement, as required, by January 2019.37 While Ontar-
io’s 24 colleges closed ranks to develop a single policy — not exposing any one institution to 
scrutiny and potential repercussions — all but three universities either developed new policies 
or tweaked pre-existing campus policies.38 Almost one year later, and only a day or two after 
the deadline, Alberta proclaimed that the province's 26 institutions had posted policies that 
align with the Chicago Statement.39
One year after Ontario’s January 2019 deadline for a government-compliant speech policy, 
there is little indication that campus free speech has been concretely altered or is at imminent 
risk from the government directive. Pursuant to the plan for ongoing monitoring and evalu-
ation of “system-level progress on the free speech policy”, Ontario’s colleges and universities 
also complied with the instruction to file an annual report addressing “implementation prog-
ress” and a summary of [each institution’s] compliance.40 Though it found no institution in 
default, the Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario’s Report of November 2019 flagged 
a systemic deficit in the policies. Specifically, the HECQO complained that university and 
college policies did not explicitly state that free speech is dominant and “unequivocally” takes 
precedence over values of civility and respect in public discourse.41 Noting that the govern-
ment did not “explicitly require a statement identifying the hierarchy of free speech over civil-
ity”, the Report nonetheless described this as an “issue to watch”.42 In doing so, this observation 
implied and assumed that the government could have, and might still, make that a mandatory 
requirement of the policy. 
principles-are-code-for-the-right-of-the-powerful-and-privileged-to-shout-down-everyone-else/>.
 36 Ibid.
 37 See e.g., Public Service Alliance of Canada, “Statement on government-mandated free speech policies” 
(undated), online: <ontario.psac.com/statement-government-mandated-free-speech-policies> (articulat-
ing the dangers and denouncing the free speech policy, calling on the government to reconsider the directive, 
withdraw prescribed disciplinary measures and threatened funding cuts, and respect the autonomy of 
institutions and speech rights of members of the academic community); See also James Turk, “No Thank 
You Premier Ford” (5 September 2018), online (blog): Centre for Free Expression Blog <https://cfe.ryerson.
ca/blog/2018/09/no-thank-you-premier-ford>. 
 38 See Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario, “Freedom of Speech on Campus, 2019 Annual Report 
to the Ontario Government” (undated), Appendix A, online: <heqco.ca/SiteCollectionDocuments/
HEQCO%202019%20Free%20Speech%20Report%20to%20Government%20REVISED.pdf> (linking the 
free speech policies of Ontario’s colleges and universities). 
 39 Moira Whyton, “Post-secondaries across Alberta adopt American-flavoured free speech policies”, 
Edmonton Journal (17 December 2019) online: <edmontonjournal.com/news/politics/post-secondaries-
across-alberta-adopt-american-flavoured-free-speech-policies>.
 40 See Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario, supra note 38, Appendix B (linking the annual reports 
filed by Ontario colleges and universities).
 41 Ibid at 2.
 42 Ibid.
12 Volume 29, Number 2, 2020
12
Furthermore, the Report maintained that the HEQCO’s task is limited to matters of imple-
mentation and does not include passing judgment on or policing institutions.43 Yet the gov-
ernment’s response to the Report offers further, troubling indication that free speech on cam-
puses is a captive of politics. In commenting on the HEQCO Report, the Ministry of Colleges 
and Universities was quick to claim that the government had “delivered on its promise” to 
uphold free speech on Ontario campuses, and that Ontario institutions were in “full compli-
ance with its new free speech policy requirements”.44 That statement confirmed and cemented 
the government’s authority to regulate free speech on campus, but did not provoke objec-
tion or challenge. Meanwhile, the coercive undercurrent and lack of transparency in Alberta’s 
policy make it difficult for institutions to gauge the risks of non-compliance.
The relative calm of the status quo may be misleading. Contests over free speech on cam-
pus are frequent, exposing unresolved tensions in highly diverse communities whose purpose 
is to join issue and engage in vibrant and open inquiry actively, freely, and with passion.45 The 
existence of a mandatory policy with a mechanism of oversight and threat of repercussions 
places institutions of higher learning at ongoing risk of government interference for — among 
other things — placing limits on free speech the government does not approve of, being overly 
solicitous of civility, or tolerating too much student activism.46 
The mandatory free speech policies are a clear and unprecedented interference in mat-
ters of internal governance that establish and validate a hierarchical relationship of subservi-
ence to government oversight. Compliance with a mandatory government policy is about 
compulsion, not freedom. It is troubling that colleges and universities in two provinces have 
accepted their subservience to the government on campus free speech, which is a core issue of 
internal governance.47 Beyond that, it is deeply concerning that this dynamic can migrate to 
other issues and even re-define the relationship between institutions of higher education and 
the government, thereby legitimizing government involvement in other aspects of university 
and academic governance. In short, the imposition of a mandatory free speech policy creates 
 43 Ibid.
 44 Ministry of Colleges and Universities, News Release, “Ontario Protecting Free Speech on Campuses” 
(4 November 2019) online: <news.ontario.ca/maesd/en/2019/11/ontario-protecting-free-speech-on-
campuses.html>.
 45 In fall 2019 there was a near-violent confrontation between activist groups at York University. See Joseph 
Brean, “York University launches review after event with ex-Israeli soldiers met with massive protest”, 
National Post (21 November 2019) online: <nationalpost.com/news/york-university-launches-review-
after-event-with-ex-israeli-soldiers-met-with-massive-protest>.
 46 Confrontation between the government and educational institutions can be avoided at moments of 
tension. The onus and risk of enforcing the Chicago Statement, and necessarily interfering in university 
affairs, are on the government. To avoid that risk, the government could defer to an institution, professing 
that its mandatory free speech policy set a broad framework that by design leaves the details to local 
implementation. The government could as easily go in a different direction, enforcing a hierarchy between 
free expression and civility, or directing an institution to allow an event it has decided not to permit.
 47 As noted above, I was a member of York University’s Free Speech Working Group in fall 2018. Within 
the Working Group I expressed my concerns about the constitutionality of this directive. The University’s 
position and preferred response was to maintain that existing policies were in compliance and could 
be refreshed and collated, following a process of consultation with the community, to comply with the 
government’s January 2019 deadline. I re-iterate that this paper expresses my views and not those of the 
University.
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precedent for the government to interfere with college and universities in areas that centre and 
define their mission.
In addition, the mandatory free speech policy is a grave violation of section 2(b) of the 
Charter, which guarantees freedom of expression. Whether the policy is generous or restric-
tive of expressive freedom matters little because the fact of compulsion is a constitutional 
violation in itself. Up to now, and perhaps because colleges and universities have complied, 
the question of constitutional rights has been in the background, playing little or no role in 
debate and discussion of the mandatory free speech policy. Freedom from compulsion and 
coercion is at the core of section 2’s fundamental freedoms, and it is wrong in principle for col-
leges and institutions to comply with directives that place them under the yoke of government 
oversight. In the circumstances, educational institutions that seemed quick to second their 
autonomy to the government might have concluded there was no other choice.
The purpose of the Charter is to protect the community from the violation of constitu-
tional rights by the state. Here, the impermissible overreaching and interference by govern-
ment with the institutional autonomy and academic freedom of colleges and universities also 
engages the Charter. On their face, the mandatory speech policies are aimed at compulsion, 
not freedom. The imposition of a mandatory policy does not advance or respect freedom but 
is, instead, its opposite. As such, the policies are a form of compelled expression and asso-
ciation that violate core Charter principles, including Big M’s conception of freedom as the 
absence of coercion.
Freedom: the absence of coercion or constraint48 
Compelling expression is just as serious a violation of section 2(b) of the Charter as prohibit-
ing it; in many ways, compelling affirmation or adoption of an objectionable point of view is 
a more egregious violation of freedom than prohibiting a point of view being voiced. In this 
instance, there can be no doubt that the governments' mandatory free speech policies engage 
constitutional rights, and the fact that institutions complied in both provinces does not negate 
the violation. If and when Ontario imposes a budgetary penalty or challenges a university 
decision - i.e., on civility, the use of university space, external speakers - section 2(b) of the 
Charter will be engaged. Constitutional rights might also be at issue in Alberta, should the 
promises of collaboration and flexibility break down to expose conflict between campus pro-
tocols and the government's conception of what free speech requires.
Freedom rests on two core principles and cannot thrive without a robust conception of 
each. First, a commitment to tolerance for offensive, repugnant, and unacceptable points of 
view is reflected in Irwin Toy's framework principle of content neutrality.49 The Court’s com-
mitment to that principle was confirmed and doctrinalized in its egalitarian definition of 
 48 Big M, supra note 2 at 336.
 49 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 968, 969, 58 DLR (4th) 577 (stating that freedom 
of expression is guaranteed so that "everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all 
expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream," and 
adding therefore that the Court cannot exclude "human activity" from the scope of expressive freedom "on 
the basis of the content or meaning being conveyed") [Irwin Toy].
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expression as “any attempt to convey meaning”.50 Drawing from Big M, the second is a vision 
of freedom as the absence of coercion or constraint. Both core principles are implicated where 
free speech on campus is at issue. 
The overarching goal of these governmental policies is to superimpose an official view of 
free speech and control the scope of expressive activity on campus. In other words, the issue 
is about who controls what expression is permitted, and whether it is a matter of government 
authority or university governance. The government can only regulate expressive activity on 
campus by overriding the traditional prerogative of colleges and universities to decide this 
issue as a matter of institutional autonomy and local governance.51 Yet, as the Supreme Court 
of Canada has declared, “[t]he government […] has no legal power to control the university 
even if it wishe[s] to do so”.52 More recently, Canadian Federation of Students explained that 
Ontario has had a “legislated policy of non-interference in university affairs” for more than 
100 years, finding as a result that the student fees directive represented “a significant incursion 
into the ability of universities to govern their affairs autonomously”.53 Directives that compel 
universities to comply with a state-prescribed free speech policy interfere equally with institu-
tional autonomy and academic freedom. As such, these policies raise the second key principle 
in the conception of freedom, and that is freedom from coercion or constraint.
Big M’s contribution to the methodology of Charter interpretation was as monumental as 
its conception of freedom. Specifically, the Court’s call for a “generous” interpretation of the 
Charter’s rights and freedoms, “rather than a legalistic one”, has been enormously influential.54 
That generosity has only partly been realized under section 2(b); while it set a low threshold 
for breach when the government prohibits expressive activity, the Court has been less certain 
whether and in what circumstances the Charter protects freedom from compulsion by the 
state. 
The judicial resistance to constitutional claims of freedom from compulsion traces in part 
to the dynamics of democratic governance. Being co-opted by government policies and pro-
grams, including those that are objectionable, is constant because it is inherent in being a 
member of a democratic community.55 In principle, the protocols of democratic governance, 
including the rules of responsible parliamentary government and regular elections, sufficiently 
protect the interests of those who dislike or reject a governing party’s platform. Against that 
understanding of the relationship between the government and its citizens, courts have found 
find it difficult to conceptualize and articulate when mandatory policies cross the threshold 
into impermissible forms of state compulsion. Mandatory gas pump stickers, the Law Society 
 50 Ibid at 969 (stating if an activity “conveys or attempts to convey meaning, it has expressive meaning and 
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee”).
 51 Local free speech governance has always been subject to the law, including criminal law concerning hate 
propaganda, human rights legislation, and civil law (i.e., the law of defamation).
 52 McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 299 at 273, 76 DLR (4th) 545 (per La Forest J).
 53 Canadian Federation of Students, supra note 30 at paras 8, 18.
 54 Big M, supra note 2 at 344.
 55 In Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211 at 260, 81 DLR (4th) 545, Wilson J. 
maintained that freedom from association would lead to absurd results, such as the right to challenge taxes 
that were then used to support causes taxpayers find objectionable [Lavigne]. La Forest J. remarked, as well, 
that “it certainly could not have been intended that s.2(d) protect us against the association with others that 
is a necessary and inevitable part of membership in a democratic community”; ibid at 320.
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of Ontario’s mandatory declaration of values (the SOP), the Canada Summer Jobs attestation, 
and the citizenship oath to the Queen are among the manifold ways the government compels 
the voices of its community in more or less invasive ways. At the least, the Charter must apply 
when the state compels members of the community to affirm, endorse, or adopt a policy, 
creed, pledge, or partisan position and attaches consequences to non-compliance.56
Part of the resistance to constitutionalizing freedom from government compulsion is also 
contextual. It is surprising, for instance, that the Charter jurisprudence has been slow to incor-
porate Big M’s conception of freedom into the section 2(b) jurisprudence. With the exception 
of Devine v. Quebec, Big M’s insights on coercion have played little or no role in discussion of 
freedom from compulsion; only a few claims have succeeded under section 2(b), albeit with-
out substantial or meaningful discussion of how and why coercion threatens freedom.57
The question of compulsion under subsections 2(b) and (d) has only received careful con-
sideration in two cases arising in a labour union context, where the state’s regulation of union 
membership and compulsory dues to support non-workplace issues was at stake.58 With some 
justices dismissing the concept of non-association absolutely and others suggesting a higher 
threshold under section 2(d), the Court in Lavigne v OSPEU signalled its discomfort with the 
concept and was unable to agree on a standard for breach.59 Only La Forest J. returned to Big 
M and relied on its conception of freedom in finding that “[f]orced association will stifle the 
individual’s potential for self-fulfillment and realization as surely as voluntary association will 
develop it”.60 
Justice McLachlin spoke only for herself in setting a high threshold for breach, indicating 
that a claim for freedom from compulsion is contingent on criteria of forced ideological con-
formity, public identification with an objectionable message, and the presence or absence of 
opportunities to disavow the offending message.61 In principle, the question of breach should 
not depend on whether ideological conformity is demanded, whether the expression com-
 56 In McAteer v Canada (AG), 2014 ONCA 578, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a compulsory oath to 
the Queen, as part of citizenship eligibility, did not even constitute a prima facie violation of the Charter. 
 57 See e.g., Devine v Quebec (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 790, 55 DLR (4th) 641 (citing Big M and finding that Quebec’s 
outdoor advertising sign law violated s.2(b) of the Charter by prohibiting the use of the English language 
as well as by compelling the exclusive use of the French language); See also RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada 
(AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199, 127 DLR (4th) 1 (concluding that Parliament’s mandatory unattributed tobacco 
package warnings violated s.2(b) of the Charter); See also Libman v Quebec (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 569, 151 
DLR (4th) 385 (concluding that Quebec’s referendum law compelling third parties to participate either 
in “yes” or “no” committees, without sufficient alternative options for participation, violated s.2(b) of the 
Charter); See also Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1089, 59 DLR (4th) 416 (rejecting 
the claim that a mediator’s order requiring an employer to write a mandatory reference letter violated 
s.2(b)).
 58 Lavigne, supra note 55 (rejecting the claim that mandatory union dues used for non-workplace objectives 
are impermissible forms of compelled expression and association); See R v Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd, 
2001 SCC 70 (rejecting the claim that mandatory union membership as a condition of employment violates 
s.2(d) of the Charter).
 59 See Lavigne, supra note 55 at 263, 270 (per Wilson J, excluding the right not to associate from s.2(d) and 
deflecting claims of non-association to ss.2(b) and 7 of the Charter and then stating, under s.2(b), that it 
was not necessary to decide whether the guarantee includes a right not to express oneself at all on an issue).
 60 Ibid at 318.
 61 Ibid at 343, 344, and 273 (per Wilson J, on disavowal).
16 Volume 29, Number 2, 2020
16
pelled is objectively and publicly identified with an individual or institution, or whether there 
are opportunities for those compelled to disavow the message.62 The better view is that a stan-
dard more analogous to the low threshold for breach of expressive freedom — the Irwin Toy 
test — should apply when freedom from compelled expression or association is at issue.63 
Even under a more onerous standard of compulsion, the governments’ mandatory cam-
pus speech policies offend the Charter: they are a form of forced ideological conformity that 
publicly identifies colleges and universities with a governmental conception of free speech, 
and does not permit institutions to disavow the policy. Despite her hostility to the claim in 
Lavigne, Wilson J. agreed that it would clearly violate section 2(b) for the government “to put 
a particular message into the mouth of [an individual]”.64 That is precisely the purpose and 
effect of compulsory free speech policies for colleges and universities.
From the perspective of Charter interpretation, the deeper concern is that the rules for 
freedom from coercion are out of touch with section 2’s core purposes. Again, that purpose is 
to protect vulnerable individuals and institutions from the state’s coercive power, whether it 
operates as a prohibition on expressive freedom or a compulsion to adopt a government mes-
sage or practice. In that regard, Big M is still the closest the Court has come to grasping section 
2’s essence: in the context of section 2(a)’s guarantee of religious freedom, Big M represents the 
Court’s most insightful discussion of compulsion as a profound violation of freedom.
At this time, any number of current examples provide an opportunity to ameliorate the 
Charter’s approach to freedom from compelled expression and association. For instance, liti-
gation arising from the Ontario government’s mandatory gas pump stickers will allow the 
judiciary to incorporate and embed Big M’s concept of freedom from coercion in section 2(b). 
In similar fashion, any attempt to enforce an official government policy on campus free speech 
will enable, and even require, colleges and universities to defend their constitutional rights. 
There, as well, Big M vindicates the claim and, in the process, institutions might also have the 
opportunity to reclaim and revitalize their autonomy in matters of university governance. 
Compelled freedom’s paradox
In Big M, Justice Dickson defined coercion as “blatant forms of compulsion”, such as “direct 
commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanctions”.65 That definition accurately 
and decisively describes Ontario’s mandatory free speech policy for colleges and universities 
across the province. Even without the threat of immediate sanctions, it also describes Alberta’s 
“collaborative” and flexible approach. No academic institution would freely choose to comply 
with dictates that so profoundly vitiate longstanding understandings of institutional auton-
omy, local governance, and academic freedom. As Justice Dickson again recognized, no one 
who is compelled to a course of action or inaction is “truly free”.66 In 1985, that included a 
 62 Ibid at 322. As La Forest J stated, “[i]t is of little solace to a person who is compelled to associate with others 
against his or her own will that no one will attribute the views of the group to that person.”
 63 Ibid at 328. Note also that La Forest J proposed a more generous conception of freedom from compelled 
association in Lavigne.
 64 Ibid at 267.
 65 Big M, supra note 2 [emphasis added].
 66 Ibid.
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corporate drugstore selling bicycle locks on a Sunday, and in 2020 it must include institutions 
of higher learning. The imposition of a state-based version of the Chicago Statement on Free 
Expression Principles constitutes an impermissible form of compelled expression and associa-
tion with a governmental conception of what expression is free. In principle, is much better 
than a university free expression policy that is controversial or restrictive, a more generous 
conception of free expression imposed by government.
A byproduct of mandatory free speech is that the policies fundamentally alter the Charter 
status of colleges and universities, in two ways. First, the policies directly interfere with the 
section 2 rights of these institutions of higher education, and are subject to the Charter. Any 
attempt to enforce a governmental view of expressive freedom is therefore open to challenge 
under the Charter. In Ontario, student federations have successfully challenged the province’s 
attempt to regulate student fees, albeit not in relation to the Charter. Second, and equally 
important, free speech policies in Ontario and Alberta are now a matter of government policy, 
and any limits on campus expression — i.e., those that were formerly a matter of local gover-
nance – are now subject to the Charter.67 While some may welcome this change, others might 
regard it as a further loss of institutional autonomy and deference to the local governance of 
university affairs.
Beyond these concerns, the imposition of a mandatory free speech policy points to and 
reinforces a more ominous development: the rise of mechanisms — in a variety of contexts 
and settings — to compel members of a democratic community to observe and adopt var-
ious state-based ideological, religious, political, and partisan positions by members of the 
democratic community. As suggested above, these are serious incursions that fundamentally 
undermine Big M’s core conception of freedom as the absence of coercion or constraint. These 
incursions must be resisted and met by a robust conception of freedom from compulsion 
under section 2 of the Charter. Achieving that goal is simply a matter of adopting and acting 
on Big M’s conception of freedom under section 2 of the Charter, including its guarantees of 
expressive and associational freedom.
 67 See UAlberta Pro-Life v Governors of the University of Alberta, 2020 ABCA 1 (applying the Charter to the 
university, independently of the mandatory free speech policy).
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